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INTRODUCTION
As part of Ontario's "Who Does What" (WDW) and Local Services Realignment (LSR)
initiatives, key elements for funding and control of the province's ambulance services
were devolved to Upper Tier Municipalities (UTMs) and Designated Delivery Agents
(DDAs) beginning in 1998. Devolution is defined as the transfer or delegation of power

to a lower level, especially by cental governments to local or regional administration1.
This differs somewhat from the definition of downloading, i.e., to shift or relegate

responsibilities or costs for a program from one level of government to a lower one2.
Regardless, the provincial government insisted that the LSR process was not about

squeezing budgets, but rather about more efficient government using best practices to
save money for the taxpayer, while sorting out which level of government could best

deliver a particular service3. Their stated goal was more accountable, less costly and
simplified government4.

1 The New Oxford Dictionary of English, Pg. 506

2 The Canadian Oxford Dictionary. Interestingly, a reference to downloading otlicr than in the computer
sense, cannot even be found in the New Oxford Dictionary of English. The only definition is found in the Canadian
Oxford Dictionary where it is noted to be of Canadian origin, with the Harris "download" of social services used as
an example.

3 Speaking Notes for Minister Al Leach - Association of Counties and Regions Conference, Sudbury,
October 6, 1997, Pg. 5

4 "Who Does What" in Ontario: The process of provincial-municipal disentanglement, Pg. 176
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This paper has four main objectives:
•

First, to document the process of transition from a provincially micro-managed

ambulance system to fifty separate and distinct units operating under a common
set of guiding principles.
•

Second, to compare the levels of service provided and costs incurred at both the
provincial and municipal levels, pre and post transition.

Third, to use data from sample municipalities in an attempt to determine
differences in costs and service levels between municipalities who chose to

contract for ambulance service rather than deliver it themselves.
•

The paper concludes with a summary of the perceived successes and failures of
the transition of Ontario's ambulance services, and discusses whether the action
met the government of the day's objectives for their WDW initiative.

To best understand the issues involved, it is necessary to begin by reviewing the histoiy
of this unique public service.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMBULANCE SERVICE IN ONTARIO

Not unlike other jurisdictions, Ontario's ambulance services have emerged from roots
embedded in both health care and the private sector, evolving along a somewhat
convoluted path into the current municipally controlled service delivery models. While

the first municipally funded hospital ambulance services appeared in Toronto as early as

1880, and were similarly well established in Berlin-Waterloo by 1903s, Emergency
Medical Services (EMS) were not municipal priorities in other parts of the province.

During the first half of the 20th century, it was not uncommon to see private ambulance
services operating as sidelines for funeral homes, or even furniture stores, taxi and towing
companies. While some would see providing ambulance service as a serious conflict of
interest for the funeral director, their involvement was generally borne out of a
commitment to provide a much needed community service... not to mention that theirs
was often the only equipment in town capable of comfortably transporting patients lying
down! The funeral home was already staffed, the telephone answered 24 hours a day, and

the staffs education in the natural sciences, second only to that of the local physician.6

In larger communities, a number of commercial ambulance services were often available,
although no means existed to co-ordinate their efforts. There was no provincial funding

for ambulance services, payment was on a full fee-for-service basis, and there were no
uniform standards for patient care, training or equipment.7 No 9-1-1 telephone or
centralized dispatch systems were yet in place, and a competitive element often affected

quality of care provided. Unlike today, it was sometimes better to be the last ambulance
arriving at the scene of a motor vehicle collision, rather than the first and fastest.

5 A Century of Red Blankets, Pg. 15

gmrs

6 The 1,100-Year History of the Ambulance, Pg. 49

7 The Final Report of Uie Emergency Medical Services Review, Pg. 2

$m\
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Arriving ambulances commonly blocked the ambulance ahead to prevent them from

being able to transport patients. Thus, the last arriving ambulance was the only one
assured of a paying customer. Despite the competition, there was no guarantee that the
personnel aboard any of these ambulances were even marginally trained. No standard of

training was prescribed, and one 1963 study revealed that only 141 of 181 operators

contacted, even had staff with basic first aid training8.

During the late 1960s, Dr. Norman McNally, then Director of the Emergency Health
Services Division (EHS) of the Ontario Hospital Services Commission (forerunner of
today's Ministry of Health and Long Term Care), was charged with developing "a

balanced and integrated system of ambulance services..."9 out of a "hodge podge" of 425
services of widely varying quality that existed around the province. Under his direction,
EHS set out to first standardize training levels among ambulance attendants, then
improve vehicles and equipment. McNally's stated goal was eliminating the private

services, then consolidating them to gain benefits of scale, and placing them under the
control of hospitals where stable funding, training and quality assurance could be

maintained.10 Unfortunately, the cost of this worthwhile venture was grossly
underestimated, and financial limitations negated the government's wholesale purchase of
all private ambulance services.

8 A Century of Red Blankets, Pg. 63

9 Ibid, Pg. 67
10 The Business of Ambulance Service In Ontario, Pg. 1

From 1968-1973, licensed ambulance services could not be sold between operators... only

back to the Ontario Hospital Services Commission (the Ministry of Health after 1971).

The mid-1970s however, saw a reversal of this trend towards public consolidation, with a
new emphasis on private sector involvement in the management and delivery of
ambulance services. From 1973 on, service licenses and assets were bought and sold as

business undertakings.11

What remained in place from the 1970s was an ever-evolving mix of approximately 175
publicly contracted (hospital and municipal), private, and directly operated (OPS)
ambulance services, that were all fully funded and directed by the Ministry of Health.

/^^

Some 40% of these services were operated by private individuals/corporations in a unique
relationship described by the Executive Director of the now defunct Ontario Ambulance
Operators' Association:

Beginning with the first Ambulance Act in 1966, private operators and the
Ontario government entered into a form ofpublic/private partnership. The
government provided the vehicles and the cash while the operators provided

business expertise and operational acumen}2

While the private operators obviously felt they had control over their own businesses and
the Ministry considered them independent operators, a review of the actual business
practices indicates otherwise. Ambulance Operators acted in a managerial role rather

11 The Final Report of the Emergency Medical Services Review, Pg. 3
12 The Business of Ambulance Service in Ontario, Preface
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than a traditional "at risk" entrepreneurial business relationship. Micro-management was
a hallmark of the Ministry-Operator relationship, with every aspect of the operation
significantly controlled by the Ministry. Operations of the services were managed

centrally through six Regional offices of the Emergency Health Services Branch.
Ambulances and major capital equipment were provided at no charge to the Operator,

while other expenses were detailed in Ministry-approved line-by-line budgets, and then
cash flowed automatically to the Operator. A system of "one-time" approvals and
payments was provided for unexpected expenditures. As any expenditure required prior

Ministry approval before proceeding, there was little if any capital risk to the Operator.13

During the decade preceding the WDW activities, labour unions strongly lobbied for
change in the governance of ambulance services that they hoped would lead to service

improvements, widespread implementation of advanced paramedic skills, and
standardization of wages. The most significant outcome of their efforts was a 1989

Labour Relations Tribunal report commonly known as the "McKechnie Report"14 (after
the Collingwood ambulance operator of the day), in which the Ontario Public Services

Employees Union (OPSEU) challenged the government's stance that ambulance

operators were independent businesses.

13 Emergency Medical Services in the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, Pgs. 3-4
14 Ontario Public Service Labour Relations Tribunal between OPSEU and the Crown, in the Right of
Ontario (MOH) and McKechnie Ambulance Service Inc.
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The Tribunal concluded:

that the ambulance service provided by McKechnie Ambulance is the Ministry's

business.

Virtually every significant and tiny aspect of the business is tightly

controlled by the Ministry. There is virtually nothing of substance left for
McKechnie Ambulance to decide. There is virtually no room for independent
discretion.

They decided that on the basis of perspective of control, ownership of tools, and chance
of profit and risk of loss, that the Province was actually the Employer. They further
designated McKechnie Ambulance as an Agent of the Crown, and its employees as
Crown employees for bargaining purposes. The McKechnie decision ultimately resulted
in the similar designation of some 97 ambulance operators and their employees through
1995's Public Service Act Regulation 57/95. The initial result of this decision was first

time central bargaining and wages matching their Ontario Public Service (OPS)
counterparts, for many of the private ambulance operators and their employees.

Despite two major reviews of EMS governance and structure, this rather eclectic mix of
"private", hospital, municipal and OPS ambulance services remained in place until the
Local Services Realignment initiative of the Harris era. Interestingly, in The Final Report

of the Emergency Medical Services Review commissioned by the Ministry of Health in
1991, the Review's Chair, Professor Gene Swimmer, unknowingly predicted the decision

11

that would have to be made seven years in the future as part of WDW:

/ think that the public (all provincial employees and state assets - author's
clarification) and municipal models, identified as having the most positive

aspects, are of equal merit. It is probably true that a public model will
provide a higher minimum standard ofservice across the province, at a
potentially higher cost. Other than that the major point of comparison

seems to be the organizational model itself, involving a decision on whether
emergency health services should be provided by the provincial government

or devolved to the municipal level.l5

THE HARRIS "WHO DOES WHAT" INITIATIVE

This section is not intended as a comprehensive review of the Harris government's efforts
at provincial-municipal disentanglement, but rather will summarize the WDW elements

that directly affected realignment of ambulance services in the province.16

Under Harris, Ontario's Progressive Conservatives with their "Common Sense
Revolution" manifesto, won a resounding victory in the 1995 provincial election. Four

key themes made up this Common Sense Revolution platform: Less and Simpler
Government reducing waste and overlap between levels of government (as well as
reducing involvement of the provincial government in direct service delivery); a Fiscal

Focus on attacking the provincial deficit and cutting provincial income taxes; and a

15 Final Report of the Emergency Medical Services Review, Pg. 19

16 For a comprehensive review of the entire process including prescription of the Toronto megacity, refer
to the Graham and Phillips' article: "IVJto Does Wliat" in Ontario: The process ofprovincial-municipal
disentanglement
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Competitiveness Agenda promoting a leaner, simpler and fiscally tight-fisted government

that would once again have Ontario "open for business".17

Having sensed that their "Common Sense Revolution" had struck a sympathetic chord
with the electorate, the Harris Government moved decisively and immediately upon

taking office. Massive budget cuts and the initiation of major restructuring across the
education, health and municipal fields were packaged together so as not to attract undue
attention to any one specific effort. In their paper, Graham and Phillips describe the
Harris government as wanting to "reshape their core business and simplify and reduce the

entire public sector".18

The resulting Omnibus Bill 26 (the Ontario Savings ami Restructuring Act) led to the
May 1996 appointment of the "Who Does What" Panel, chaired by well respected former

Toronto Mayor and MP David Crombie. The Panel was empowered to make
recommendations on how best to overhaul funding and delivery of a wide range of

government services at both the provincial and municipal levels, with the overall goal
being the reduction of waste, duplication, and the overall cost of government. Subpanels

were planned to specifically address 1) tax reform and the assessment system; 2)
emergency services; 3) social services; 4) transportation and utilities; 5) municipal

17 .„

Who Does What" in Ontario: The process of provincial-municipal disentanglement, Pg. 178

18 Ibid, Pg. 182
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administration; 6) education; and 7) public health.19

Given the government's intention

to move quickly, time lines were extremely tight with the Panel directed to provide short
sequential reports from the subpanels, and have all of the Panel's work completed within
seven months.

The WDW Panel adopted four guiding principles20 for its wide ranging scope of work:
•

Municipalities were to be seen as having strong roles in "hard" services to
property and infrastructure, while "soft" human services such as education, child

care, health and welfare would be seen more appropriately as a provincial

responsibility.
Income redistribution, as a "soft" service, should be funded provincially.

•

Where possible, only one level of government should be responsible for spending

decisions, and that government should have funding responsibility.
•

There should be an appropriate balance between the allocation of responsibilities
and availability of resources, i.e., service exchanges between levels of government
should be revenue neutral.

In all, the WDW Panel made over 200 recommendations within these principles. As the
Ministry of Health was in the midst of its own health-care restructuring process, it was

19

.,

Who Does What" in Ontario: The process of provincial-municipal disentanglement, Pg. 183

20 Ibid, Pg. 185

hesitant to participate in WDW and the seventh subpanel on Public Health never came to
fruition. Health issues were addressed instead by the Social Services subpanel, or in the
case of ambulance services, through the emergency services discussions. The Emergency

Services subpanel report of November 12, 1996, viewed ambulance services as part of the

health care system and recommended that they continue to be provincially funded. This
recommendation included fully funding Toronto EMS ($35 million) which had a lengthy
history of cost-sharing ambulance service costs to allow for levels of service above the

provincial "standard".21

Within three weeks of Crombie's final report letter on December 23, 1996, the

government acted on its disentanglement plans. Rather than producing discussion papers
that were open to negotiation with stakeholders, the government's "Megaweek"
announcements unveiled final plans obviously intended for quick passage by its majority
in the legislature. While the government accepted most of Crombie's recommendations,
its own agenda forced a departure on several key elements.

Harris' stated intention to gain full control of education, directly contradicted both a

WDW Panel guiding principle and the recommendation in Crombie's final letter. If such
a huge expenditure moved from the residential property tax base, there was simply no
way that other high cost human services such as social services, could also be fully

c

21 WDW Panel, Emergency Services Letter - November 12, 1996
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transferred. It became a fairly simple exercise then, of filling the tax gap left by
education, with other services that could be transferred to the municipalities. Graham and
Phillips describe this mathematical exercise as the reason "why social housing - which
was not part of the Crombie panel's discussions - became part of the Megaweek

equation.".22

While not officially confirmed, anecdotal information would indicate that

the downloading of ambulance services was a similar monetary chip put forward in direct
opposition to Crombie's recommendations.

The announcements over four days during the week of January 13, 1997, consolidated the
government's disentanglement initiatives. Monday saw education costs removed from

the residential tax base with the number of school boards and trustees cut as well, while

Tuesday was the day for ambulance and other soft services. As of 1998, municipalities
would assume full responsibility for the cost of ambulance services, as well as social

housing, public health, special care homes and rural policing. In addition, the cost of
child care, long term care and welfare programs, shifted significantly to the

municipalities. Wednesday saw hard services such as local airports and femes, public
transit, water and sewage treatment transferred to municipalities, while Thursday revealed
the planned introduction of property-tax reform based on actual-value assessment.

22

Who Docs What" in Ontario: The process of provincial-municipal disentanglement, Pg. 187
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Despite evidence to the contrary, the Harris government continued to deny the initiative
was merely a downloading of costs to the municipalities. Graham and Phillips noted the
major municipal concerns that:
expenditures on services with consistently countercyclical demands (such
as welfare) or with consistently rising costs (such as long term care) (and
ambulance services - author's comment) would undermine the stability of

municipal revenue sources. To the municipal sector, the province appeared

to have been strategic in downloading services with costs that were rising
or difficult to control while assuming education, the costs of which are more
constant and controllable. Ifstable or declining birthrates are any predictor

of education costs, education expenditures may eventually shrink.23

Months later with the deadline for devolution approaching, then Municipal Affairs and
Housing Minister Al Leach, continued to reinforce the government's view that WDW
was not about downloading:

this is not about counting the number of services and dividing them up
between the province and municipalities. This is about improving the

way we all deliver services... clarifying lines of responsibility... increasing
accountability... lowering costs... providing better services to the people

of this province.24

23 "Who Does What" in Ontario: The process of provincial-municipal disentanglement, Pg. 191

f
\

24

Speaking Notes for Minister Al Leach - Association of Counties and Regions Conference, Sudbury,

October 6, 1997, Pg. 6
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THE TRANSITION TO MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF AMBULANCE SERVICES
As of January 1, 1998, Upper Tier Municipalities became responsible for 100% of land
ambulance costs. The initial municipal response was overwhelming opposition. While
many municipalities felt that ambulance services were a clear and appropriate provincial

Health responsibility, more were simply concerned with the fiscal impact of any
downloading to the local tax base. However, the intensity of opposition lessened
significantly once negotiations between the government and AMO resulted in a March
1999 cost-sharing announcement. Among other funding changes, the province agreed to
pay 50% of approved ambulance costs, retroactive to January 1, 1999.25 26

In conjunction with the initial funding responsibility transfer, all Upper Tier
Municipalities and Designated Delivery Agents had been given overall operational
responsibility for land ambulance services, effective January 1, 2000. This responsibility
allowed municipalities to either contract or directly deliver land ambulance services.
With the March 1999 announcement regarding 50/50 cost sharing, the deadline to assume
operational responsibility was postponed until January 1, 2001 at the request of

municipalities.27

25 Land Ambulance Transition Practical Guide, Pg. 2
/P»v

f

26 Local Services Realignment Guide, Pages 4.38-4.39

27 Land Ambulance Transition Practical Guide, Pg. 2

f^

18
During the subsequent transition period, the Minister adopted recommendations made by
system stakeholders through the Land Ambulance Transition Taskforce (LATT), in

setting guiding principles for municipalities to adhere to upon selecting a service delivery

option.28 29 Each municipality was required to ensure an uninterrupted transfer of
ambulance service from the Province, with the service provided conforming to the
Ambulance Act, applicable regulations and other relevant legislation. The guiding

principles adopted,30 required ambulance service to continue to be:
•

Accessible: All residents of Ontario are to have equal access to ambulance service
regardless of socio-economic or demographic status. Upper Tier Municipalities,
in co-operation with their delivery agents, will be responsible for ensuring that

sufficient resources are available to guarantee reasonable access to ambulance
service.

Integrated: Each ambulance service and ambulance is an integrated part of the

Emergency Health Care Services System of the Province. Patient transport

between health care facilities for medically essential services must remain an
essential part of this system. Central Ambulance Communications Centres

(CACCs) will ensure that the closest available, appropriate ambulance vehicle

responds to a call to meet the needs of a patient. Upper Tier Municipalities, in co
operation with their delivery agents, will be responsible for ensuring that land

no

Review of the Ambulance Regulation/Report of the Land Ambulance Transition Task Force, Pg. 3

29 Land Ambulance Transition Practical Guide, Pg. 4
30

Emergency Medical Services in the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, Pg. 7
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ambulance service continues to be an integrated part of the provincial Emergency
Health Care Services System.
•

Seamless: The closest available and appropriate ambulance will respond to a

patient at any time and in any jurisdiction regardless of political, administrative or
other artificially imposed boundaries. Upper Tier Municipalities and their service

delivery agents are obliged to ensure that ambulance services are readily available
regardless of location or timing.
Accountable: Ambulance service operators are medically, operationally and

financially accountable to provide ambulance service and patient care that is of the
highest possible caliber. Service delivery will be monitored by municipalities, as
well as through Base Hospitals, CACCs and the Ministry of Health and Long
Term Care. Upper Tier Municipalities will bear overall accountability for service

delivery through their agreements with operators.

•

Responsive: Municipalities and ambulance service operators must remain
responsive to the changing health care, demographic, socio-economic and medical
needs in their area.

As part of the transition process and upon assuming control, vehicle and equipment assets

owned by the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, were transferred to municipalities
at no cost.

20

OPTIONS FOR SERVICE DELIVERY

There has been considerable debate over who should provide paramedic services to the
public. However, even California's libertarian "free minds and free markets" think tank:
The Reason Foundation, agrees that:

the key to superior EMS performance is not, per se, whether government
or the private sector is the paramedic provider, but whether the system is

designed and structured for efficient and effective performance?1

Both high and low quality services are routinely produced by organizations representing
the entire socialized (public) and privatized spectrum of ambulance service providers.
Ernst and Young's 1996 review of the then Metropolitan Toronto Ambulance Service,
fiirther noted that:

there is no scientific evidence that a particular EMS system run by a
private provider, fire department, etc., is more effective than another.
In addition, the studies that review one system/ownership model over

another typically have specific agendas which add to the complexity

of the analysis.32

The Ontario Hospital Association position paper on ambulance issues suggests an

overarching principle where regardless of service model:

// is integral to the efficiency and effectiveness of the broader health
system in Ontario, that the land ambulance system be based on sound
financial, organizational and administrative principles so those who

use ambulance services receive the best possible care.3i

31 Privatizing Emergency Medical Services: How Cities Can Cut Costs and Save Lives , Pg. 5
32 Review of the Metropolitan Toronto Ambulance Service, Pg. viii
33 Land Ambulance Issues for Ontario's Hospitals, Pg. 5
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Hospitals certainly have an important stake in ensuring the continued quality and

timeliness of local ambulance services, as these factors afFect the condition of the patient
upon arrival in their emergency departments. Receiving high quality pre-hospital care

improves patient outcomes, decreases the length of a patient's hospital stay, and
positively impacts on the overall use of hospital resources. Delays in the arrival of
ambulances for transportation to other diagnostic and treatment facilities can create
significant inefficiencies in hospital operations and cause discomfort and anxiety for
patients. As hospitals pay for nursing escorts to accompany many of these patients,
inefficiencies within the ambulance system can significantly increase hospital operational
costs.

With emergency call volumes continuing to grow, the availability of ambulances to

perform inter-hospital transfers has lessened. Understandably, municipalities and
hospitals alike, feel these essential transfers are a responsibility of the Ministry of Health
and have requested additional funding and the development of a parallel patient transfer
system to resolve these concerns. The Ministry has since engaged the 1BI Group to make

recommendations on this issue, but at the time of transition, the responsibility for these
transfers remained with the municipalities.

As noted earlier, municipalities were given the option of either becoming the service

provider themselves or contracting for ambulance services. Permitted contracting options
\

were either continuing with all of the existing providers in their municipality, or awarding

22

delivery to the successful applicant in a call for "highest quality, best price" proposals.
With a key theme of the Common Sense Revolution being the "open for business"
competitiveness agenda, many felt that the government was promoting fully privatized
ambulance service in the Province. A number of groups and supporting documents
appeared overnight, espousing the virtues of privatized ambulance service under the guise

of Public-Private partnerships.34 While the documents tended to disguise their blatant
preference for privatization with well written overviews that educated the inexperienced
on Emergency Medical Services basics, they were conspicuous in their sponsorship by

major American ambulance consolidators and private ambulance associations.

Surprising I'm sure, to those promoting WDW as a means of cutting the size of
government through "contracting out", many municipalities reviewed the options

available and ultimately chose to deliver ambulance services. Other municipalities chose
to temporarily contract with an established provider while "learning the ambulance

business". Several of these municipalities are now converting to the direct delivery
model as well.

What is perhaps more surprising, is the reduction in significance of "not-for-profit"

hospital-based ambulance services. Hospital-based services made up nearly 40% of all
ambulance services in the province at the time of devolution, and were the principal

jP*v

'

34 E.g., Contracting for Emergency Ambulance Services - Revised for Use in Ontario; Options for

Municipal Emergency Medical Services - A User's Guide (Ontario); Towards Best Practices in Ambulance Services
- A Submission to the Ontario Land Ambulance Task Force

f^
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providers in northern Ontario (62% in Northeastern and 55% in Northwestern Ontario).35

Today, only 28% of the Designated Delivery Agents contract with one or more hospitals
to provide service36, and the number continues to drop.

Many hospitals did not show any interest in bidding for contracted services, choosing to
concentrate on their "core" hospital services rather than subsidizing an underfunded
ambulance system. There were however, key exceptions in major players such as

Kingston and Niagara's Hotel Dieu Hospitals, that both felt regionalized ambulance
service operations were key health services they should provide for their communities.

0**^

In considering service delivery options, municipalities conducted a number of in-depth
costing reviews and failed attempts at negotiating reasonable contracts with existing

service providers.37 A number of significant experiences are summarized as examples:
The IBI Group, acting as consultants for ten Southwestern Ontario Upper Tier
Municipalities (Bruce, Elgin, Grey, Huron, Lambton, Middlesex, Oxford, Perth,
Chatham-Kent, and then Haldimand-Norfolk), reported "Municipal Delivery"

(direct delivery) as the least expensive model for providing ambulance service in
all ten of the study municipalities. "Municipal Delivery" was between 2.3% and

35 Land Ambulance Issues for Ontario's Hospitals, Pg. 10

j^

36 Compiled from EMS Municipal Organizational Chart - Association of Municipal Emergency Medical

Services of Ontario, and Emergency Health Services Branch Directory or Ambulance System Services

37 Emergency Medical Services in the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, Pgs. 10-11
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3.2% less costly (mean 2.7%) than "Service Management" (contracted out).38
Despite this determination, six of these municipalities initially chose contracting
out, although two have since converted to direct delivery.

In a similar review conducted for Durham, York and Halton Regions, IBI
projected the cost differences between a "Public Service" (direct delivery) model
and "Private-for-Profit" (contracted out) model. By 2004, the "Public Service"
model was estimated to save $2.86, $3.06 and $1.46 million annually in Durham,

York and Halton Regions respectively.39
Niagara Region chose to undertake an RFP process for contracts reflecting the
existing level of service, then compared the preferred bidder to an independently

created Direct Delivery Business Plan. Three bids were received: Hotel Dieu
Hospital (the existing provider in St. Catharines), Canadian Medical Response
(CMR) - A division of Laidlaw, and Rural/Metro Ontario. Over the five year term
of the contract, the two private contractors bid $6.87 - $11.7 million more than

Hotel Dieu ($1.37 - $2.34 million per year). Despite this, the year 2000 costs by
Hotel Dieu were $.6 million more than the same level of service under the "Direct

Delivery" option. As the independently created proposal lacked certain critical
elements, the Region chose to award the initial contract to Hotel Dieu, while

further considering and developing the "Direct Delivery" option.

38 Southwestern Ontario Municipalities Land Ambulance Service Review
39

Land Ambulance Services Review - The Regional Municipalities of Durham, York and Halton
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Hamilton-Wentworth Region (Now the New City of Hamilton) chose "Direct
Delivery" after an unsuccessful negotiation attempt with existing provider, CMR.
The "Direct Delivery" budget for 2000 was $11.9 million as compared to the
CMR bid of $13.7 million, for an annual saving of approximately $1.805 million.
In work completed for the Region of Sudbury (Now the City of Greater Sudbury),
IBI predicted 2002 service costs of $12.7 million for outsourcing vs. $10.6 million

for "Direct Delivery". The outsourcing costing included 14% in estimated

business allowances/contingencies.40
In an internal review, Waterloo Region predicted that "Direct Delivery" would
provide an immediate saving of over $666,300 per annum over the cost of
"Contracting Out", and that the difference would grow with the anticipated

enhancement of service levels.41

Four years after the original devolution announcement, the process of transferring

responsibility for land ambulance service from the province to municipalities, was finally
completed. As of January 1, 2001, all Upper Tier Municipalities and Designated Delivery
Agents assumed full responsibility to contract for, or to directly deliver ambulance

service within their designated areas.

40 Land Ambulance Services Study, Interim Report - Regional Municipality of Sudbury
41 Emergency Medical Services in the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, Pg. 48
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There are presently 50 land ambulance service areas covering the province, of which 24
are Upper Tier Municipalities and 26 are designated land ambulance delivery agents. Of
the 50 service areas, 41 are also Consolidated Municipal Service Managers (CMSMs) for

Public Housing and Social Services.42 In addition, three First Nations communities act as
ambulance Designated Delivery Agents for the James Bay Coast, Oshweken (Six
Nations), and Wikwemikong areas.

Although the mixture continues to evolve, at the time of writing, Upper Tier
Municipalities and Designated Delivery Agents are providing service as follows:
•

f*

23 deliver ambulance services as a department of the organization (Direct

Delivery);
•

24 contract out ambulance services to another agency or coiporation; and
3 use a combination of direct delivery and contracting out.

Three designated delivery services have announced plans to convert contracted service to
direct delivery, effective January 1, 2003. By that date, direct delivery of ambulance
services will be provided to over two-thirds of Ontario's population.43

42 Roles and Responsibilities - 2001 - The Provincial-Municipal Relationship in Human Services

43 Calculated from Population and Dwelling Counts, for Canada, Provinces and Territories, and Census

Divisions, 2001 and 1996 Censuses

27

CHANGES IN ACCOUNTABILITY

Historically, the Ministry of Health funded, directed and managed all elements of the
provincial ambulance system, including policy development, service design and delivery,
the Base Hospital quality assurance programs, dispatch of EMS resources, as well as

providing vehicles and other capital equipment. With the recent devolution of land
ambulance services to Upper Tier Municipalities, a new inter-governmental management
relationship has emerged. This partnership is described by the IBI group in their recently
completed "External Review of Hamilton CACC":

The result is a newly evolving management paradigm in which all land
ambulance stakeholders, including UTMs, MOHLTC and CACC must
leant to function within a decentralized system of shared accountability,
with shared authority for specific components of the system, while working
collectively to ensure the efficient, effective and seamless delivery of quality
emergency medical services (EMS).44

While provincial and municipal responsibilities for ambulance service are set out in
legislation, the system stakeholders have been working through the Land Ambulance
Implementation Steering Committee (LAISC) to establish and modify the appropriate
policies, protocols and working relationships necessary in the new paradigm.

44 External Review of Hamilton CACC, Pg. 4
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The Ambulance Act sets out the Minister's duties and powers to45:
•

administer and enforce the Act;

•

establish a council for the purpose of advising the Minister on matters respecting

the provision of ambulance services46;
•

ensure a balanced and integrated system of ambulance and communication
services;

•

establish, maintain and operate communication services, alone or in co-operation
with others, and to fund such services;

•

establish standards for Certification, Patient Care and Transportation, Ambulance

Service Documentation, Response Times and Communicable Disease, ensure

#**"

compliance with these standards, and appoint an authority to certify ambulance
operators;

•

monitor, inspect and evaluate ambulance services, investigate complaints; and

•

fund and ensure the provision of air ambulance services.

45 Sec. 4.(3): Part II - Provincial Responsibilities - Ambulance Act
46 At present, LAISC serves this role
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Interestingly, while the Ministry's responsibility for funding air ambulance services is
established under the Act, financial support of land ambulance services is provided

through a much more permissive statement. Section 4.(3) in Part II of the Act, states:

The Minister may (emphasis added by a\ithor)make grants to upper-tier
municipalities, local municipalities, delivery agents and operators for the

purpose of ensuring the provision of services under this act."

Upper Tier Municipalities are responsible for all costs associated with land ambulance

service, subject to any such grants made by the Minister (currently 50% of approved costs

as determined by a Ministry funding template). They must also48:
•

establish governance mechanisms and the organizational structure that will
manage the local ambulance system;

•

develop short and long-term plans for meeting the needs of persons in the
municipality, and engage in planning with neighbouring municipalities to ensure
seamless service across area boundaries;

•

determine whether to deliver the services directly or in a contracted relationship
with a third party, and if so, manage contracts with these parties;

•

ensure the supply of vehicles, equipment, services and information necessary for

the proper provision of ambulance service;
•

ensure the training and supervision of staff, maintenance of vehicles and
equipment, and the provision of a quality assurance program; and

47 Sec. 4.(3): Part II - Provincial Responsibilities - Ambulance Acl
48

Roles and Responsibilities - 2001 - The Provincial-Municipal Relationship in Human Services, Pgs. 3-5
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ensure that service levels and quality are maintained, as is compliance with the
legislated land ambulance service standards.

A MEASURE OF PROVINCIAL EMS FUNDING BASED ON POPULATION
AND SYSTEM CALL GROWTH

During the last decade of total Ministry of Health control of ambulance services,
providers complained constantly of serious under-resourcing from their masters. Hospital
restructuring and a growing, aging population, seriously affected local ambulance
services' ability to maintain appropriate service levels, especially in the rapid growth
regions in and around the GTA. Even EHS has hesitatingly admitted to the need for

additional funding. In their 1993 presentation to the Ambulance Study Committee
reviewing systemwide governance options, EHS noted that "the current system, although

under-funded, gives good value for the money.".49 The Ontario Hospital Association's
position paper: "Land Ambulance Issues for Ontario's Hospitals" further suggested that

many costs of providing ambulance service were not being funded (at least to
Hospital-based services), and "that a more accurate cost of transport may be 22% greater

than the transfer payments now made by the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care".50

>sr»\
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49 Report of the Ambulance Study Committee, Pg. 9
50 Land Ambulance Issues for Ontario's Hospitals, Pg. 42
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Historical Emergency Health Services Branch expenditures are detailed in Appendix II,

with comparators broken down at Appendix IVs1. A comparison of annual expenditures
(April to March) to provincial population (as of July 1st each year) reveals a yearly cost
per Ontario resident ranging from a low of $26.25 (1998-1999) to a high of $34.73 in
2000-2001. When the entire time frame from fiscal year 1996-1997 to 2001-2002 is
reviewed, per resident EHS expenditures rose 12.5% or $1.12 ($28.53 - $32.10

respectively). The provincial population during the same time frame rose a similarl 1.6%
or 1.53 million residents. Unfortunately, an aging and ailing population resulted in
provincial ambulance call growth during the same years, of nearly 234,000 patient
carrying calls (Codes 1-4), and almost 342,000 calls overall (Codes 1-4+8). This growth

(f^

in call volume represented 26.4% and 30.5% increases respectively.

Emergency calls (Codes 3-4) rose 34.8% in the same time period (Calculated from data at
Appendix IV). Ontario remains well above the industry expectations of 1 emergency

response per day for every 7,000 - 10,000 residents52, with a calculated volume of 1.32 1.89 during 2001 (Calculated from data at Appendix IV).

Although the provincial contribution kept pace with population growth between 19962001, it seriously underfunded system call growth. In fact, the 2001-2002 EHS estimated

51 Call volumes as provided by EHS from ARIS data. Received July 11, 2002. Expenditure calculations
using data from Appendix II.
52

Predicting Demand for Ambulance Service

expenditure per patient carrying call ($340.29) and all calls ($260.86), is less than the
same per call calculations in 1996-1997 ($342.72 and $271.36 respectively).

When a 10.7% cumulative Ontario inflation rate is factored in for the same five-year time

period", current EHS expenditures reflected in 1996 dollars total $28.99 per resident,
$307.28 per patient carrying call, and $235.56 per call (Cl-4+8). True EHS expenditures
per call are now 89.7% (Cl-4) and 86.8% (Cl-4+8) of those during 1996-1997, despite

over a 26% increase in call volume. It is important to realize however, that while the true
EHS contribution has fallen, it now represents (at best) only 50% of EMS system
funding.

Another, albeit poorly documented concern, has been the disparity in provincial funding

between geographic regions. While limited in scope, the data collected for our six sample
municipalities (i.e., Durham, Essex, Halton, Middlesex, Niagara and Waterloo) as
summarized at Appendix VI, reveals Ministry funding across Southern Ontario ranging
from $11.70 - $22.80 per resident during 1998.

53 Consumer Price Index Historical Summary

THE RESPONSE TIME "STANDARD"

As part of the regulations set in place to "safeguard" the public in the wake of devolution,

the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care amended the Ambulance Act to require that:
The operator of an ambulance service in an upper tier municipality or designated
area shall ensure that, in 90% of the priority 4 (life threatening) calls received in
a twelve month period, the response time performance is equal to the response
time performance set by the person who operated the service in 1996.5*

1996 was selected for the benchmark year as this was the last full year that the Ministry
had total control of ambulance service operations. While this requirement became known
as the 1996 Emergency Response Time "Standard", it was anything but a true level of

quality. A standard is normally thought of as being authoritative or of permanent value,

^

and so is widely performed.55 In reality, this "Standard" simply required ambulance
services to provide the same level of service as in 1996. A municipality with poor
response times in 1996 was only guaranteed the same poor response times in 2001 and
beyond.

In a survey of 1996 emergency response times in 18 Upper Tier Municipalities and their

192 local municipalities, the 90* percentile response time ranged from a low of 5 minutes
50 seconds, to a high of 48 minutes 52 seconds.56 Each of these municipalities at the
extreme ends of the spectrum, would be seen as "meeting the standard" if they maintained

54 Sec. 42. (l)Ontario Regulation 501/97 Amended to O. Reg. 571/98

55 The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998, Pg. 1812

56 Unpublished undated survey by the Association of Municipal Emergency Medical Services of Ontario
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these response times, despite the obvious disparity in service levels. In the calculation,

the operator's response time performance is measured from the time the crew is notified
of the call, until the time paramedics arrive on-scene. This represents only the ambulance
service components of reaction and travel time. To obtain a truly representative EMS
"system response time", an additional two minutes must be added to address call handling

time lines used by Ministry of Health dispatch centres. In comparison to this flexible
"standard", the industry (urban) standard is a 90* percentile response time of less than
nine minutes from the time the call is received at the dispatch centre, until the time
paramedics arrive on scene.57

With the previously documented provincial call and population growth, and the lack of
historic service enhancement funding to address these issues, most municipalities
suffered from response times well above the 1996 levels by the time they took over

responsibility for ambulance service. Municipalities took exception to being forced to
provide a level of service that was not already being provided by the Ministry of Health at
the time of transition.

In response to municipal pressure through AMO and the Land

Ambulance Implementation Steering Committee (LAISC), the Ministry agreed to provide
additional funding to help return response times to the 1996 baseline.

In late 2000, the province distributed a funding template defining land ambulance costs

which were eligible for a 50% provincial grant. The template however, applied only to the

57

Principles of EMS Systems, Pg. 115
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level of ambulance service in existence on the day of assumption by the municipality.

Although municipalities have completed numerous "best practices" template submissions
to support their requests for both the base funding and 1996 response time issues funding,
all are still waiting for Ministry funding to address 2001 and 2002 shortfalls. At the most

recent LAISC meeting (July 29, 2002), the Ministry refused to indicate when such a
funding announcement could be expected.

In light of serious response time issues and the ongoing Ministry procrastination, some

municipalities chose to add resources notwithstanding, hoping to receive retroactive
funding at a later date. Others chose to implement only the municipally funded 50% of
planned enhancements, while the remainder refused to trust any predicted enhancement
approvals and withheld improvements until funding was actually in hand. These varied

approaches have obviously produced mixed results (and variations in Ministry costsharing percentages), some of which are described below.

A COMPARISON OF DEVOLUTION EFFECTS ON SAMPLE
MUNICIPALITIES

Six Upper Tier Municipalities were selected for in depth reviews of the service and

financial effects of LSR. The Region of Niagara and County of Middlesex were selected
to represent Upper Tier Municipalities that had opted for "Contracting Out". The
Regions of Durham, Halton, and Waterloo represented those municipalities choosing
"Direct Delivery", while the County of Essex was selected as a hybrid utilizing both
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"Direct Delivery" and "Contracting Out". All of the samples were participants in the
province's OPALS (Ontario Pre Hospital Advanced Life Support) study providing the
highest standard of patient care available, in at least a portion of each UTM. The six
municipalities combined, represented a population of 2,509,379 (22% of the province's

population) during the 2001 census.58

The municipalities polled, provided selected information for the calendar years 1996 2001. These years represent the two most recent census periods for population growth

data, while 1996 was also used by the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care to set

emergency response time standards. Where available, the information provided included
total Population, the annual municipally-approved EMS expenditures, number of

ambulance hours staffed and stations occupied, call volumes, and the Region-wide
response time used to measure compliance with the legislated standard. Due to a lack of

consistently accurate municipal population data by year, only Census data was used in the
calculations. All data for the sample municipalities is detailed at Appendix V.

Due to service costs pre-devolution being mixed between multiple providers and across
municipal boundaries and different fiscal years, it is sometimes difficult, if not impossible

to determine true costs for a given Upper Tier Municipality during 1998.

In three of the

municipalities, i.e., Durham, Essex and Niagara, the major provider pre-transition was the

■

58 Calculated from Population and Dwelling Counts, for Canada, Provinces and Territories, and Census
Divisions, 2001 and 1996 Censuses
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Ministry of Health, and invoiced costs included a myriad of allocated but unconfirmed

administrative costs from head office operations. At the same time, much of the overhead
cost information was not provided (i.e., Ministry self-funded WSIB costs and other

benefits). These services are similarly not included in the payment details provided in

Public Accounts, so previous years' costs cannot be confirmed beyond the Ministry
provided estimates. Many of these operations functioned out of stations built with
Ministry funds on hospital property, and leased back to the operators at $ 1 a year. Upon
transition, most hospitals either evicted ambulance operators or raised rents to reflect
market value. The additional costs of acquiring new stations are reflected in 2001

municipal costs, but did not qualify for Ministry funding.

Regional Municipality of Durham

Durham Region had a 2001 Census population of 506,901. With ambulance service
previously provided by a mixture of hospital, private and Ministry providers, Durham
transitioned to municipal control on January 1, 2000. Since then, direct delivery has been

provided by a division of the Public Health Department.

In 1998, the municipality was billed $9.5 million as the 100% cost of the existing
provincially controlled ambulance service. This represented a per resident cost of $20.71
based on the 1996 Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was
calculated at $293.01. The cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $81.46.
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The 2001 cost of providing municipal ambulance service was $17.6 million (40%
Ministry cost-share). This represented a per resident cost of $34.77 based on the 2001

Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was calculated at
$424.23, and the cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $109.91. During the
time period, Durham added 43,799 vehicle hours, a 37.6% increase in non cost-shared
coverage.

County of Essex
Essex County had a 2001 Census population of 374,975. With ambulance service

previously provided by a mixture of private, volunteer and Ministry providers, Essex
transitioned to municipal control on January 1, 2001. Since then, a unique delivery

scheme has existed with direct delivery being provided by a stand alone County
department in the City of Windsor alone (The area covered by the previous Ministry

service). The remainder of the County is covered by the three previous contractors (two
private and one volunteer service).

In 1998, the municipality was billed $7.9 million as the 100% cost of the existing
provincially controlled ambulance service. This represented a per resident cost of $22.63
based on the 1996 Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was
calculated at $212.63. The cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $70.51.
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The 2001 cost of providing municipal ambulance service was $16.0 million (46%

Ministry cost-share). This represented a per resident cost of $42.70 based on the 2001
Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was calculated at
$337.97, and the cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $135.13. During the
time period, Essex added 6,049 vehicle hours, a 5.4% increase in non cost-shared
coverage.

Regional Municipality of Halton

Halton Region had a 2001 Census population of 375,229. With ambulance service

previously provided by a mixture of private and volunteer providers, Halton transitioned
to municipal control on August 16, 2000. Since then, the hours provided by volunteers

have been converted to paid hours. Direct delivery service is being provided as a division
of the Health Department.

In 1998, the municipality was billed $4.7 million as the 100% cost of the existing

provincially controlled ambulance service. This represented a per resident cost of $ 13.91.
The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was calculated at $289.44. The cost per
hour of ambulance service provided was $75.84.

The 2001 cost of providing municipal ambulance service was $9.7 million (32% Ministry
cost-share). This represented a per resident cost of $25.84 based on the 2001 Census
population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was calculated at $435.67, and
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the cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $100.83. During the time period,
Halton added 33,796 vehicle hours, a 54.2% increase in non cost-shared coverage.

County of Middlesex

Middlesex County had a 2001 Census population of 403,185. With ambulance service

previously provided by a mixture of private contractors, Middlesex transitioned to
municipal control on April 23, 2000. Since then, a single private contractor was selected

in response to an RFP process. This contractor works under the supervision of the
County Transportation and Emergency Services Department.

In 1998, the municipality was billed $8.6 million as the 100% cost of the existing

provincially controlled ambulance service. This represented a per resident cost of $21.97

based on the 1996 Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was
calculated at $241.62. The cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $94.47,
although there is a question as to what percentage of budgeted hours were actually
delivered.

The 2001 cost of providing municipal ambulance service was $12.4 million (51.8%

Ministry cost-share when 100% First Nations and OPALS funding applicable for this
municipality are incorporated). This represented a per resident cost of $32.02 based on

the 2001 Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was calculated

at $289.06, and the cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $139.05. During the
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time period, Middlesex added 2,258 vehicle hours, a 2.5% increase in non cost-shared
coverage.

Regional Municipality of Niagara

Niagara Region had a 2001 Census population of 410,574. With ambulance service

previously provided by a mixture of hospital, private and Ministry providers, Niagara
transitioned to municipal control on January 1, 2000. Since then, a single hospital
contractor was selected in response to an RFP process. This contractor works under the

supervision of the Niagara Region Health Department.

In 1998, the municipality was billed $9.2 million as the 100% cost of the existing

provincially controlled ambulance service. This represented a per resident cost of $22.80

based on the 1996 Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was
calculated at $253.55. The cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $85.19.

The 2001 cost of providing municipal ambulance service was $15.3 million (36.6%

Ministry cost-share). This represented a per resident cost of $37.26 based on the 2001
Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was calculated at
$318.75, and the cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $105.52. During the
time period, Niagara added 37,000 vehicle hours, a 34.3% increase in non cost-shared
coverage.
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Regional Municipality of Waterloo
The Region of Waterloo had a 2001 Census population of 438,515. With ambulance

service previously provided by a hospital and private provider, Waterloo transitioned to
municipal control on December 3, 2000. Since then, direct delivery service has been
provided as a division of the Public Health department.

In 1998, the municipality was billed $4.7 million as the 100% cost of the existing

provincially controlled ambulance service. This represented a per resident cost of $11.70
based on the 1996 Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was
calculated at $211.20. The cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $85.80.

The 2001 cost of providing municipal ambulance service was $6.7 million (49.3%

Ministry cost-share). This represented a per resident cost of $15.27 based on the 2001
Census population. The cost per patient carrying call (Code 1-4) was calculated at

$273.73, and the cost per hour of ambulance service provided was $114.35. During the
time period, Waterloo added 3,274 vehicle hours, a 5.9% increase in non cost-shared
coverage. Since 1998, Waterloo has had the advantage of an alternative non-emergency
transportation brokerage known as "Med-Lift". This brokerage redirects calls not

requiring an ambulance to selected public and private providers. "Med-Lift" currently
transports approximately 4,000 Code-1 and 2 patients that otherwise would have travelled

by ambulance. Since 1999, this service has been cost-shared by the Region and area
\

hospitals.

#""s
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SUMMARY OF SAMPLE MUNICIPALITY COSTS AND SERVICES
While the Ministry has used the average cost per call (Code 1 -4+8) as its measure for

charging back cross-boundary use of ambulance service between municipalities, the
number of standby calls (Code 8s) can be artificially influenced by both CACC and
ambulance service policy. As such, only potentially patient carrying calls were used in
the comparison pre and post-transition. Since a base level of emergency coverage is

required to maintain response times regardless of call volume generated, the most

sensitive indicator of ambulance service cost, is the cost per hour of actual ambulance
service provided. This cost is primarily driven by wage costs and the level of service

being provided (i.e., primary or advanced care). All of the sample municipalities
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provided a degree of advanced care prior to transition, and all have increased the number
of advanced care providers since. Similarly, all of the municipalities have added hours of
ambulance service since the transition.

Between 1998-2001, all six sample municipalities had significant increases in cost per

resident (30.5% - 88.7%), cost per Code 1-4 call (19.6% - 58.9%), and cost per hour of
ambulance service provided (23.9% - 91.6%). The municipalities all added service hours

(2.5% - 54.2% increases), with a mean increase of 23.3%. Call volumes (Codes 1-4)
increased over the time period between 9.0% and 36.2% (mean of 26.5%). If the call
volume redirected by Waterloo's "Med-Lift" is incorporated into this call growth, the

range levels to 26.2% - 36.2%, for a mean increase of 29.5% across the municipalities.

Typically, if call volume increases, cost per call should decrease, all other things being
equal, until utilization of existing resources is maximized. At that point, additional
vehicles must be added and the cost per call and cost per resident climbs appropriately.
Cost per hour is directly affected by wages, contractor profit, supply and equipment costs,

the addition of ACPs, etc. Work to decrease response times includes adding vehicle

hours, and may also involve adding stations. Cost per call and cost per resident climbs,
although the cost per hour remains relatively constant so long as existing standards (e.g.,
% ACP coverage required) remain unchanged, except if stations are added. New station

costs (e.g., debenture charges, rental and utility costs, etc.) will increase the cost per hour

of service provided.

When compared to 1998, the 2001 call volume increase was essentially the same across
the group. As such, the increase in service hours related to call growth, should have been
similar. In fact, the three direct delivery services added 32.6% more service hours while
the two contract services added 18.4%. The one combination service added 5.4% in
hours.

Despite call volume growth, the cost per patient carrying call climbed 38.5% as a group,
51.0% for direct delivery services, 21.4% for contractors, and 35.1% for the combined
service. This reflects not only the serious pre-existing under-resourcing, but the political

realities of increasing demand for service where none existed, adding ACPs, etc.
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When compared to 1998 costs for the entire group of sample municipalities, the 2001 cost
per resident increased 65.2% as a group. The three direct delivery services climbed
33.5% while the two contract services rose 82.7%. The sole combination service cost per
resident climbed 125.3%. Similarly, cost per hour of service increased 42.9% as a group,
31.8% for direct delivery services, 48.8% for contractors, and 64.4% for the combined
service.

In summary, the municipal cost to provide ambulance service increased dramatically

regardless of the service delivery option.

Although call volume increases were similar

(30.4% vs. 29.2% with Waterloo's "Med-Lift" factored in) across the sample
municipalities, direct delivery services added significantly more service hours than
contractors (32.6% vs. 18.4%), and yet had lower increases in cost per resident (33.5% vs.
82.7%) and cost per hour (31.8% vs. 48.8%). Cost per call was the only comparator
where the contractor increase was less than that of direct delivery (21.4% vs. 51.0%).
Unfortunately, the combination service was difficult to evaluate as its costs did not

consistently fall between direct delivery and contractor as expected. In fact, its
combination cost per resident and cost per hour were significantly higher than both other
options. As only one sample municipality was considered, additional research is required
to determine whether this finding can be repeated.
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MODELING THE COST OF IMPROVEMENTS IN RESPONSE TIME
Despite making significant funding investments without the benefit of matching Ministry

funding, none of our sample municipalities meet the industry nine minute gold standard.

Three of the six sample municipalities still have 90* percentile emergency response times
significantly above the 1996 standard (1 minute 19 seconds to 1 minute 32 seconds) in
2001. The cost to reach the 1996 levels will be significant in these and other

municipalities province-wide. In Niagara and Halton Regions, where the 1996 levels
have been successfully reached, unmatched annual UTM investments of $6.1 and $5.0
million respectively, were required since devolution.

In the industiy's only documented work of its kind, Fischer, O'Halloran, et al in the

Journal of Public Health Medicine59, describe the use of an "Ambulance Response
Curve" to estimate how much response time is reduced by deploying an additional

ambulance, and then use the marginal cost of this deployment to estimate the opportunity
cost of each second's improvement in response time.

The study utilizes a 1997-1998 data set from the Surrey Ambulance Service in the United
Kingdom. The County of Surrey has a very stable population of 1.08 million (6.6%
population growth between 1971-2000) with 15.8% of its population aged 65 years or

59 Ambulance Economics, PP. 413-421
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older.60 This compares with 2001 Ontario Census data indicating 12.9% of the provincial
population is aged over 65.61

Fischer and O'Halloran report that each reduction of one second in response time, costs

the service 28,000 British Pounds per year, with a standard error of approximately 4.2%.62

With the current exchange rate of 1 British Pound equaling 2.43 Canadian Dollars63, this
translates to $68,040 Canadian per second of reduction.

If this marginal cost is in fact transferable to the Ontario experience, Essex County (15
seconds) would require an additional maintained investment of $1.0 million, Middlesex
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(1 minute 19 seconds) $5.4 million, the Regions of Waterloo (1 minute 30 seconds) $6.1
million, and Durham (1 minute 32 seconds) $6.3 million to return 2001 response times to
their 1996 levels.

In Halton Region where a 1 minute 11 second reduction has been accomplished since

2000 to comply with the 1996 standard (10:56 - 9:45), the formula would calculate a
needed investment of $4.8 million per year. In fact, their investment of 5.0 million

60 Mid-Year Estimates of Population 2000, Surrey County Council Planning and Development Service
61 Statistics Canada 2001 Census Analysis Series - Profile of the Canadian population by sex and age:

Canada ages, Pg. 30

62 Ambulance Economics, Pg. 418
63 OANDA Currency Converter
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annually represents $70,423 per second of improvement gained, but includes the cost of
one additional station, and increased ACP staffing not covered in the Surrey scenario.

Similarly in Niagara Region, a 1 minute 17 second reduction (11:55 - 10:38) has been
accomplished at a cost of $6.1 million annually, with the addition of three stations and

similarly increasing ACP staffing. The Surrey formula estimates such a reduction as
costing $5.2 million.

Both Regions appear to have received good value for their additional expenditures, which

also included the conversion of volunteer and on-call hours to full-time in Halton and
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Niagara respectively.

The paper's authors take care to note that the "Ambulance Response Curve" model is

specific to Surrey costs and conditions. Yet, the examples seem to confirm that marginal
costs are remarkably similar between our two jurisdictions. In calculating the marginal

cost of running an ambulance continuously (24/7) for a year, Fischer and O'Halloran
utilized the cost of wages and benefits by paramedic level, added uniforms and vehicle

leasing (which included maintenance and equipment), but did not include fuel or medical
supplies, as demand was assumed not to increase simply with the addition of an
ambulance. The marginal cost per year for each additional ambulance was estimated at

/

250,000 Pounds" ($607,500 Canadian) which is comparable to the $600,000 figure
commonly used when estimating the cost of adding a 24/7 ambulance in Ontario.

There are differences between the costs used to calculate the Surrey model, and those of
Ontario municipalities. The sample municipalities in Ontario have had to add stations to
improve response times while the UK example does not include new building

construction. Although the costs are included in both cases, Ontario municipalities
purchase new vehicles and equipment, whereas Surrey leases both vehicles and

equipment. Finally, the Surrey service controls its own resource movements (call
volumes) by operating its own dispatch centre. In Ontario, low priority calls, standby
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coverage and other cross-boundary assistance calls are controlled by Ministry directed
dispatch centres. As such, a municipal investment in service levels intended to reduce
emergency response times locally, can be exploited by the Ministry for other means in

their quest to maintain an integrated and seamless EMS system province-wide.

A key question would seem to be: Are we putting all our money in the right place? With
a one minute reduction in actual on-road response time costing over $4.0 million (using
the Surrey calculation), it is not difficult to imagine that use of available technology such
as Automated Vehicle Locating (AVL) and appropriate Computer Aided Dispatch
(CAD), along with appropriate staffing levels in our dispatch centres, could more

economically reduce the overall response time by a minute or more. CACC dispatch time

64 Ambulance Economics, Pg. 417
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reductions should be seriously considered in concert with adding ambulance service
resources to improve response times.

COMPETITION AND COMPENSATION

Prior to the devolution and realignment of ambulance responsibilities, the paramedic
wage scale was essentially consistent across Ontario. Central bargaining for the crown
agent services closely paralleled gains obtained by the Ontario Public Service (OPS)
paramedics directly employed by the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care. These
benchmarks accompanied by Ministry-imposed wage increase limits and their direct

control of funding, effectively controlled annual wage increases across the province. In
1999, maximum hourly wages were standardized at approximately $20.00 for primary

care and $22.00 for advanced care paramedics working for land ambulance services (with

the exception of Toronto).65 66 As advanced care was perceived by the Province as an
"experiment" outside of Toronto and Hamilton, only those twenty municipalities

participating in OPALS67, were allowed (and funded) to employ the higher standard (and
higher paid) advanced care paramedics.

65 Land Ambulance Transition Practical Guide, Pg. 20

66 Emergency Medical Services in the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, Pg. 42

#"^

*

6? Burlington, Cambridge, Grimsby, Kingston, Kitchener-Waterloo, Lindsay, London, Mississauga,

Niagara Falls, Oakville, Ottawa-Carleton, Peterborough, Port Colbourne, Port Hope/Coburg, St. Catharines, Saraia,
Sudbury, Thunder Bay, Wclland and Windsor as shown in OPALS Study Communities
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Since transition to municipal control, a number of issues have served to drive EMS wages
upwards. Competition throughout the province for experienced ambulance staff at all

levels is the result of municipalities attempting to both address the legislated response
time standard, and provide service levels demanded by their taxpayers and elected
officials, e.g., ambulance stations in communities that previously had none, 24-hour

coverage where partial daily coverage existed, advanced care paramedics instead of solely
primary care, etc.

This demand was compounded by a simultaneous change in the province's community
college paramedic training programs. Ministry direction to add additional training
elements and change the existing one year programs to two years, resulted in no PCP
graduating classes in 2001... the initial year of municipal takeover and greatest demand.
As advanced care training programs had their student numbers even more tightly
restricted by the Ministry, ACPs were an even rarer, more valued commodity.

With municipal paramedic demand growing and no graduating class to fill the void,
wages were initially increased by the GTA services to prevent a loss of their existing staff
to Toronto EMS needs (traditionally the highest need and highest paid) and other services

initiating or expanding their ACP programs. The effect snowballed with outlying
services similarly raising their wages to retain and attract employees, and ultimately

paramedics in more rural and remote Ontario moving to take these higher paying jobs in
EMS growth communities.
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The situation may at best be described as fluid, with many experienced
personnel (particularly experienced paramedics) relocating from one

municipality to another in order to take advantage of the current

opportunities (oftentimes more than once).68

Where only a year earlier, paramedic positions were at a premium, and full-time
employment often meant five or more years of part-time work, or a position in the north

far from friends and family, it was now a seller's market, with municipalities everywhere
offering well paying full-time positions, relocation allowances, funding for education, etc.
By late 2001, the GTA and surrounding area wages had settled to approximately $24.50

for primary care, and $27.25 for advanced care paramedics... a 20-25% increase over the
pre-transition rates.

One very negative effect of this competition for personnel, has been the virtual

abandonment of remote northern EMS positions. Experience in the Thunder Bay District
"suggests that most paramedics prefer to work for a larger service, where there are greater

opportunities for professional development and career advancement."69 A number of
services in the north are in desperate need of staff and have been forced to reduce
coverage hours and in some cases, close stations altogether. Superior North EMS (The
City of Thunder Bay operating as the ambulance delivery agent for the District of

Thunder Bay) was forced to assume responsibility for contracted services in Nakina and
Manitouwadge earlier this year, when contractors unable to fill paramedic vacancies,

6i External Review of Hamilton CACC, Pg. 7
69 EMS Delivery Corporate Report No. 2002.159, Pg. 6
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withdrew their services.70 Superior North has resorted to flying in paramedics from
southern Ontario to serve short-term locums in the needy areas.

Municipalities operating direct delivery services have also been faced with Job
Evaluation (JE) process requirements built into their municipal collective agreements. As
the responsibilities of paramedic staff (especially advanced care paramedics) are

compared to other unionized municipal staff, upward pressure on municipal wage grids
has been the norm. A recent, as yet unpublished JE result in southwestern Ontario, has
been estimated to increase paramedic wages by 20% over the current GTA norms. As the
new rates exceed those of Police officers and Firefighters, this increase has the potential

^^

of not only increasing EMS wages across Southern Ontario, but of increasing all
emergency services wages in general.

THE EFFECTS OF DEVOLUTION ON THE PROVINCIAL EMERGENCY
HEALTH SERVICES BRANCH

It has been noted that until 1978, the Emergency Health Services Branch of the Ministry

of Health and Long Term Care had total control and funding responsibilities for all
ambulance operations in Ontario. In addition, they directly operated ten land and five air
ambulance services with their own employees. Beginning in 2000, the land operations
were devolved to Upper Tier Municipalities as they assumed control of their local

services. By the fall of 2001, all Ministry-operated air ambulance operations had been

70 EMS Delivery Corporate Report No. 2002.159, Pg. 5
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privatized in response to a Request for Proposals call. The Ministry of Health and Long
Term Care continues to directly operate 11 of the 19 Central Ambulance

Communications Centres (CACCs) in the province,71 and provides administrative system
support through the Toronto head office and five geographically dispersed field offices.
The Ministry is fully responsible for funding and providing all communications
equipment, as well as funding air ambulance operations, first nations land ambulance

services, and the provincial Base Hospital medical oversight programs.

Annual expenditures for the Emergency Health Services Branch are detailed in Appendix
II. The information shown is a compilation of data published by the Ministry of Finance

in the Public Accounts - Statement of Expenditures for the given fiscal years,72 except for
the 2001-2002 estimates which are produced by Management Board Secretariat73.

The last fiscal year period during which the Ministry of Health had full funding (100%)
and operational control of ambulance services was 1996-1997. During that year, $303.6

million were allotted to ambulance services in Ontario.74 The next two fiscal periods
were hybrids that combined partial years of 100% Ministry, 100% Municipal, and 50/50
Ministry/Municipal funding.

71 External Review of Hamilton CACC, Pg. 10

72 Public Accounts of Ontario 1996-1997 through 2000-2001

73 Expenditure Estimates for the Province of Ontario for the fiscal year ending March 31,2002
74 Public Accounts 1996/97, Pg. 4-182
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The 1999-2000 fiscal year was the first in which the 50/50 funding formula was fully in

place. During that year, Ministry expenditures totalled $404.6 million,75 climbed to

$405.9 million in 2000-2001,76 77 and are estimated at $381.1 million in 2001-2002.78
Even if the lowest, most current year's estimate is used, the resulting $77.5 million
increase over 1996-1997 (25.5%), is still a gross underestimation of total system-wide
costs. Remembering that 1996-1997 represented 100% funding by the Ministry, while

the current year represents a supposed 50% (or less) contribution, the actual increase in

the annual cost of providing ambulance service province-wide is at least $112.2 million.79
This is a 37% increase in annual costs since the last year of full Ministry control.

There is however, an obvious error in the transfer payments shown in the 2001-2002
expenditure estimates as published by Management Board. Transfer payments to

municipal ambulance operations are shown at $34.7 million80 for the year... less than the

$37.9 million shown for 1996-1997 81 when only ten municipalities (primarly remote) and
Metropolitan Toronto, operated ambulance services. Toronto's transfer payment of $35.7

75 Public Accounts 1999-2000, Pg. 4-191

76 Public Accounts 2000-2001, Pg. 4-184
77 due to one time transition costs and severance obligations
78

Expenditure Estimates for the Province of Ontario for Uie fiscal year ending March 31, 2002, Pg. 19

79 2001-2002 municipal transfer (even though in error) payments X 2 [S69.4M] + balance of 2001-2002
EHS Expenditures [S346.4M] - EHS Total for 1996-1997 [S303.6M]

z#*v

Expenditure Estimates for the Province of Ontario for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2002, Pg. 19

81 Public Accounts, 1996-1997, Pg. 4-183
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million82 made up the bulk of the payment in that year, and rose to $52.8 million in 2000-

200183... more than the total provincial amount estimated for 2001-2002. In fact, the
transfer payments for our six sample municipalities, totalled almost $26 million in 20002001. With these municipalities representing 22% of the provincial population, the

municipal transfer payment for the year should total at least $118 million.

If this $118 million estimate is inserted into the equation to calculate the 2001-2002

actual cost of operating ambulance services province wide,84 annual costs actually
increased some $295.5 million in 2001-2002 over that of 1996-1997... a 97% increase in
annual costs.

Two other factors must be considered when measuring the true effect on the EHS branch.
It was noted earlier that between 2000 and 2002, the Ministry of Health divested itself of

its direct land and air ambulance operations. This should have resulted in an immediate
and dramatic reduction in wage costs, albeit with a corresponding increase in transfer
payments. While the total effects of the air ambulance privatization will not be shown

until the next fiscal period (2002-2003), the portion of the EHS budget allocated to

salaries, wages and benefits, continues to climb dramatically despite these changes. The

82 Public Accounts, 1996-1997, Pg. 133
83 Public Accounts, 2000-2001, Pg. 149

84 2001-2002 municipal transfer payments X 2 [S336M] + balance of 2001-2002 EHS Expenditures
[S263.1M] - EHS Total for 1996-1997 [S303.6M]
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2001-2002 estimated cost of $69.6 million as published in the Management Board

Secretariat Expenditure Estimates85, is a 52% increase over 2000-2001 ($45.8 million)86,
and a 32% increase over 1999-2000 ($52.6 million)87, despite a reduction of
approximately 700 operational staff.

When this published increase was questioned during a recent conversation between the

author and the Branch's Financial Analyst88, she stated that monies had been incorrectly
allocated in the current estimates, and that some of the Salaries and Wages correctly
belonged under Transfer Payments (This further confirmed our concerns about accuracy

of the Transfer Payments costing). She refused to provide the correct amounts, but said
they would be adjusted appropriately in the upcoming Public Accounts, Statement of

Expenditures.89

If the 2001-2002 estimate for salaries, wages and benefits is in fact incorrect, the best
available comparison would then be between fiscal years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001. In

this time period, EHS salaries, wages and benefits dropped from $52.6 million to $45.8
million, a reduction of 13%.

85 Expenditure Estimates for the Province of Ontario for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2002, Pg. 19
86 Public Accounts - 2000-2001, Pg. 4-185
87

Public Accounts - 1999-2000, Pg. 4-192

Telephone conversation with M. Wilcox, July 23, 2002

89 Publication Expected: Fall, 2002
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Despite numerous written and verbal requests for staffing information by Branch sections,
EHS refused to provide the requested information for inclusion in this paper. As such, a
rough modelling of EHS staffing levels was attempted from available information.
Details are shown in Appendix VII.

The 1999-2000 (last available) Civil Service Commission Annual Report reported 8,570
employees at the Ministry of Health, representing 15.6% of a total Civil Service

complement of 54,952.90 No detail was provided regarding staff numbers assigned to
each branch of the Ministry. The Report did provide data which allowed calculation of
the percentage of the Civil Service paid in each ten thousand dollar salary range. When
the $41.8 million shown in 1999-2000 EHS Expenditures for Salaries and Wages91 was
separated using these same percentages, a total complement of approximately 828 Full

Time Equivalent employees was estimated at a mean annual salary of $50,500. This
compares favourably to an overall Ministry of Health mean of $53,026 calculated by

dividing the Ministry salaries and wages expenditure by the Civil Service Commission
employee count.

Wage increases were limited by government policy to 2% in each of 2000-2001 and
2001-2002. Without increasing the number of staff, this should have raised overall EHS
Salaries and Wages to $42.6 million in 2000-2001, and $43.5 million in 2001-2002. In

90 Civil Service Commission Annual Report -1999-2000, Pg. 25
91 Public Accounts - 1999-2000, Pg. 4-192
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fact, the estimated Salaries and Wages for 2001-2002 are reported by Management Board

Secretariat as $58.2 million92, a 39.2% increase over 1999-2000. When the 2% increase
for each year, is applied to the mean annual salary previously calculated, a new mean of
$51,510 is calculated for 2000-2001, with a mean of $52,540 for 2001-2002.

When the 2001-2002 mean wage is divided into the $58.2 million annual total as
estimated, a complement of approximately 1,107 Full Time Equivalent employees results.

This would represent a staff increase of 279 employees (33.7%) within the EHS Branch

despite a reduction often land and five air ambulance services with their respective
employee complements.

Given the Branch's claim that the 2001-2002 Expenditure Estimates are incorrect, EHS
staffing was estimated for the 2000-2001 year as well. When the 2000-2001 mean wage

of $51,510 is divided into the $35.4 million salaries and wages allotment93, a complement
of approximately 687 employees (a calculated reduction of 141 full time equivalents from
our 1999-2000 estimate of 828 FTEs) is revealed. As the Branch verbally claims a

reduction of 641 staff (602 paramedics, 23 managers and 16 administrative staff) through

the devolution of Ministry-operated land ambulance services94, the actual 2000-2001

92

Expenditure Estimates for the Province of Ontario for the fiscal year ending March 31,2002, Pg. 19

93 Public Accounts - 2000-2001, Pg. 4-185
94

Telephone conversation with M. Wilcox, July 23, 2002
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complement should be no more than 187 employees... a 500 employee difference, unless
positions have been added in the remaining sections of the Branch.

With devolution of the Ministry's land ambulance services occurring at various times
during 2000, a more forgiving estimate would leave these employees with the Branch
until the end of the year (nine months into the 2000-2001 fiscal year). 75% (ninetwelfths) of the annual mean wage for the year is $38,633. When multiplied by the
number of staff ultimately devolved (641), those staff represent $24.8 million in wages,

leaving $10.6 million in annual wages for the staff remaining at the Branch. When this
$10.6 million is divided by the mean wage for the full year ($51,510), a calculated

complement of approximately 206 employees remains. This represents a calculated
increase of 19 employees ($978,690) despite the devolution of responsibility for at least
641 staff members to municipalities.

There are obviously numerous areas where the accuracy of this modelling can be
challenged. To most accurately represent the effect on Emergency Health Services
Branch, true staffing levels by operational section of the Branch are necessary. The

Ministry's marginal release of information does not match anecdotal and other

information available. The union representing OPS staff, released information that "more
than 100 OPSEU members face(d) layoff as a result of the privatization" of Ministry air

ambulance operations95. OPSEU further estimated the cost of legislated severance for

95 Privatized air ambulance will "Walkertonize" the skies, OPSEU says
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"classified" (full-time permanent) air ambulance staff at approximately $1.6 million.96
Further details are necessary to factor in severance for the 641 devolved land ambulance
staff that the Ministry admits to.

Another issue of concern is the effect of the industry's strong part-time staffing

contingent on Ministry numbers. While all staff numbers presented have been assumed
to be full-time equivalents, there is no confirmation of this. Our modelling appears to

indicate slightly more than 200 employees remaining at the Branch, yet anecdotal
information from CACC staff, indicates their understanding that there are over 300 staff

employed in dispatch operations alone. The recent IBI "External Review of Hamilton
CACC" appears to support this with its description of approved staffing complements for

three of the Ministry's eleven dispatch centres: Hamilton97, Barrie98, and London"
totalling 91 FTEs. Even if the eight remaining CACCs averaged only 15 FTEs each, this

would still amount to an additional 120 FTEs for a total of 211 staff assigned to CACCs
alone. Obviously, clarification is necessary.

Unfortunately, with only minimal information provided by the Ministry, a truly accurate
picture cannot be assured. With the information available to us, it does appear that the

96 Air Ambulance Fact Sheet #1

97 External Review of Hamilton CACC, Pg. 23
#

98

Ibid, Pg. C-6

99

Ibid, Pg. C-8
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annual cost of providing provincial ambulance service has almost doubled (97% increase)

since the last year of full Ministry control. It also appears that despite the devolution of
hundreds of paramedics and support staff as well as all land ambulance operational

responsibilities to municipalities, the now primarily administrative Branch continues to
grow significantly.

CONCLUSION

This paper has documented the transition of ambulance services from provincial to

municipal control, described the effects of this devolution on municipalities and the

provincial Emergency Health Services Branch, and compared direct delivery operations

(^

to those of contracted providers. But did this devolution fulfill the "Who Does What"
objectives originally set out? Did it result in a more efficient, accountable, less costly and
simplified government that saved taxpayers money, while sorting out which level of
government should best deliver ambulance service?

I think not. Although the service was definitely under-resourced historically based on call
volume growth, and has had service levels increased dramatically since 1998,100 the cost

of providing ambulance service in Ontario has almost doubled since devolution to
municipalities. The EHS bureaucracy continues to grow despite a loss of most
operational responsibilities. Rather than clearly devolving responsibilities, many have

become duplicate efforts between the municipalities and the Province. Local

100 23% increase in hours provided in our sample shown at Appendix VI
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accountability has improved for some aspects of the service, but become more confused
for others. There is certainly not one level of government responsible for spending
decisions and funding responsibility.

Subsidiarity is the principle that a central authority should have a subsidiary function,

performing only those tasks which cannot be performed at a more local level101... the view
that public services are most efficiently and effectively delivered by the most local level
of government capable of providing them. Emergency services have typically been seen
as worthy of the most local control possible. Police Services Boards and the insistence of
local municipalities to maintain control of fire departments, are two very significant

r^

examples. The understanding of unique local needs and priorities, being able to address
them without regard for the provincial "flavour of the month", yet being fully accountable

through locally elected officials, enhances the provision of all local emergency services.
Yet, in an unpublished draft, Sancton suggests a difference in public opinion when it

comes to municipal ambulance services:

many people view health as a provincial responsibility and fire as municipal.
Such people would not support municipalities taking over ambulance if the
result were that poorer areas of the province would be forced to reduce
their own levels of service. This problem could be overcome by high levels
ofprovincial funding and regulation, although the argument would then be
that such provincial involvement would mean an excessively entangled

system the accountability of which would be insufficiently clear.162

101 The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998, Pg. 1851
102 Chapter 8 - Emergency Services - Unpublished Draft
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As described throughout the paper, this is exactly what has happened in Ontario. What
was needed was a mechanism to add elements of openness, local accountability, control
and flexibility to the existing provincial ambulance system.

But instead of admitting and

addressing weaknesses in the system and regional disparities in funding and service
levels, the Ministry chose to challenge the documented needs, control the funding and

hide behind their own statistics until release was forced. They chose a similar controlling
tactic with their refusal to provide what should have been public information for this
paper.

The devolution of ambulance services to municipal control was a political decision, then
and now strenuously opposed by the bureaucrats in EHS.

What may have started as a

means to fill part of the education tax gap, served to expose the provincial ambulance
system as seriously under-resourced and struggling under province-wide increases in both
emergency calls and non-emergency transfers as the population both ages and ails.

Rather than being a key partner in the province's rationalization of hospital services
through timely movement of patients to tertiary care and diagnostic facilities, the existing

ambulance system is often the main culprit in missed appointments, failure to free up
acute care hospital beds, and the inability to admit Emergency Department patients to
hospital. This failure to provide routine transportation needs, ultimately prevents
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ambulances from offloading patients requiring emergency care at hospital... A giant
transportation "merry-go-round" affecting the most basic abilities of the health care
system to function the way it must.

Municipalities have been forced to address local EMS needs in ways never previously
attemped by the Ministry. Significant municipal resources have been added in an attempt
to reduce response times and meet new provincially set standards. But when it was

identified that their own CACCs were not operating up to similar standards, the Ministry
simply removed any reference to the dispatch standard from legislation. Improving

dispatch through updated technology and appropriate staffing was, and still is, an
excellent and cost-effective means of improving system-wide response times.

Municipal political pressure to add advanced care paramedics, has overridden the
province's view of this high level of patient care as but an "experiment". Where wage

scales were once tightly controlled, the marketplace has now determined wages based on
tight supply and high demand. This has divided the province into "have" and "have not"

regions with regards to ambulance service. We are seeing the beginnings of this division
with our current northern paramedic shortages. Where a seamless system across

municipal boundaries once existed, there are now concerns about using one's own highly
valued resources to service a neighbouring under-resourced municipality. Maintaining

the seamless nature of a provincial ambulance system will be a significant challenge in

f

the future.
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The guiding principles for the devolution of ambulance services were intended to
maintain a system that was at once Accessible, Integrated, Seamless, Accountable and
Responsive. Unfortunately, what has been gained in local accountability and

responsiveness, has been lost in reduced accessibility, health system integration and

seamlessness. Residents of "have" municipalities will continue to benefit from the
devolution as their service needs are identified and service levels improved. "Have not"
municipalities however, will continue to view EMS as an unwanted downloading and

maintain the same substandard service levels as before. The issue now will be finding
and affording the paramedics needed to provide even this level of service.
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APPENDIX I -Distribution of Ambulance Service Delivery Models
by Land Ambulance Service Area,
Effective July, 2002

City of Cornwall (for The United Counties
of Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry)

Direct

City of Greater Sudbury

Direct

City of Hamilton

Direct

City of Kawartha Lakes

Contract (Direct Delivery as of January 1,
2003)

0

City of Ottawa

Direct

City of Toronto

Direct

County of Brant

Direct

County of Bruce

Direct

County of DufTerin

Contract

County of Elgin

Contract

County of Essex/City of Windsor

Direct (1), Contract (3)

County of Frontenac

Contract

County of Grey

Contract

County of Haldimand

Direct

County of Haliburton

Direct

County of Hastings

Contract (Direct Delivery as of January 1,
2003)

County of Huron

Direct

County of Lambton

Direct

County of Lanark

Contract

County of Leeds and Grenville

Direct

County of Lennox and Addington

Contract

County of Middlesex

Contract

County of Norfolk

Direct

County of Northumberland

Contract

County of Oxford

Direct

County of Perth

Direct

County of Peterborough

Direct

County of Prince Edward

Contract

County of Renfrew

Contract

County of Simcoe

Contract

County of Wellington

Contract

United Counties of Prescott and Russell

Direct

District of Algoma

DSSAB - Direct

District of Cochrane

DSSAB - Direct (1), Contract (6) (All Direct
when existing contracts expire)
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District of Kenora

DSSAB - Direct

District of Manitoulin/Sudbury

DSSAB - Contract (3)

District of Muskoka

Contract

District of Nipissing

DSSAB - Contract

District of Rainy River

DSSAB - Contract (2)

District of Sault Ste. Marie

DSSAB - Contract

District of Thunder Bay

Direct (1), Contract (5) (All Direct as of
January 1,2003)

District of Timiskaming

DSSAB - Contract (3)

Municipality of Chatham-Kent

Contract

Town of Parry Sound

Contract (3)

Region of Durham

Direct

Region of Halton

Direct

Region of Niagara

Contract

Region of Peel

Contract (2)

Region of Waterloo

Direct

Region of York

Direct

103

103 Compiled from EMS Municipal Organizational Chart - Association of Municipal Emergency Medical

Services of Ontario, July, 2002, Emergency Healtli Services Branch Directory of Ambulance System Services,

February 27, 2002, and EMS Service Delivery Corporate Report 2002.159, City of Thunder Bay, May 17, 2002
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APPENDIX II - Emergency Health Services Branch Expenditures by Fiscal Year
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Figure 11-1: EHS Expenditures by Fiscal Year
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APPENDIX III - EHS Transfer Payments to Regional Municipality of Waterloo
Ambulance Services
Table DI-1

*

Cambridge Memorial Hospital

**

Kitchener Waterloo Regional Ambulance (1987) Inc.

***

Base Hospital T/P calculated by year-end CMH ambulance service actuals subtracted from total CMH EHS transfer

payment
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Table III-2

Cambridge Memorial Hospital EMS budget only
**

Based on nine months of 1997/98 budget, calendarized

***

Kitchener Waterloo Regional Ambulance (1987) Inc. budget only

****

Includes Med-Lift and administration costs
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APPENDIX IV - Provincial EHS Annual Statistics
Table IV-1

74

Table IV-2
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Figure IV-1: Provincial Call Volume
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Figure IV-2: EHS Expenditures Per Call and Resident
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APPENDIX V - Expenditures and Performance Indicators by Sample Municipalities
Table V-l

*

Population and Dwelling Counts - 2001 and 1996 Censuses

**

Pg. 15 - Land Ambulance Service Review - Durham, York & Halton (Includes Vehicle and Equipment Replacement
Costs)

78

*

**

Population and Dwelling Counts - 2001 and 1996 Censuses

As obtained from the Land Ambulance Services (Essex County, Windsor and Pelee Island) Year 2000 Report - March,
1999
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Table V-3

*

Population and Dwelling Counts - 2001 and 1996 Censuses

**

Included volunteer hours

***

Full Time staffing replaced volunteer hours

****

8,760 hours not implemented due to staffing difficulties

80

Population and Dwelling Counts - 2001 and 1996 Censuses
**

***

Pg. 120 - Land Ambulance Service Review - Southwestern Ontario Municipalities (Includes Vehicle and Equipment
Replacement Costs)
Budgeted vehicle hours, but not being provided by the existing Ministry contractor
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Table V-5

*

Population and Dwelling Counts - 2001 and 1996 Censuses

**

+16,000 hours of overnight standby coverage
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*

Population and Dwelling Counts - 2001 and 1996 Censuses
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APPENDIX VI - 2001-1998 Cost Comparison by Sample Municipalities
and Provider Type

84

Waterloo's call volume increase is artificially lowered due to implementation of "Med-Lift", an alternate nonemergency patient transportation system, beginning in 1998 (Regionally funded beginning in 1999). By 2001, the

program was diverting 4,000 low priority calls per year away from ambulance. If "Med-Lift" call volume is
incorporated, the 2001 over 1998 increase in call volume is 6,023 or 26.8%.

% increase 2001 by provider type, compared to 1998 for all providers (as all providers were similarly funded and
controlled by the Ministry).
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Figure VI-1: Cost per Resident by Upper Tier Municipality
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Figure VI-2: Cost per Code 1-4 Call by Upper Tier Municipality
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Figure VI-3: Cost per Code 1-4+8 Call by Upper Tier Municipality
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APPENDIX VII - Classified Service by Salary Intervals

(As adopted from Civil Service Commission Annual Report 1999-2000)
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APPENDIX Vffl - GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ALS

Advanced Life Support... The advanced level of care provided by
Paramedics equipped with at a minimum, defibrillators and
symptom relief medications

ACP

Advanced Care Paramedic... The highest level of training for land

ambulance paramedics in Ontario. Requires graduation from a
two-year Community College program in Paramedicine, plus post
graduate training to the Advanced Care level, and provincial
certification as an Advanced Care Paramedic.
AMO

The Association of Municipalities of Ontario.

ARIS

Ambulance Response Information System... The combination of
computer hardware and software used in Ontario for Computer
Aided Dispatch and retrieval of dispatch record data.

AVL

Automated Vehicle Locating... A method of using satellites and
cellular technology to automatically track ambulances, enabling

dispatchers to select the nearest ambulance to a call.
Base Hospital

An area hospital assigned and funded by the Ministry of Health to
provide advanced level training and quality assurance programs for

local ambulance services. The Base Hospital Medical Director
delegates medical acts to be performed by area paramedics under
the auspices of his/her medical licence.
BLS

Basic Life Support... The basic level of first aid and CPR provided

by ambulance officers or firefighters not trained to the PCP or ACP
level.
CACC

Central Ambulance Communications Centre... One of nineteen
land ambulance dispatch centres in the Province, operated by/for
the Ministry of Health.

CAD

Computer Aided Dispatch technologies.

CMR

Canadian Medical Response... The now defunct division of

Laidlaw, which attempted to consolidate Ontario's private
ambulance services in a manner similar to their actions in the U.S.
CMSM

Consolidated Municipal Services Manager.
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DDA

Designated Delivery Agent for ambulance services when an Upper
Tier Municipality is not in place.

Dispatch Codes

The priority assigned to a call by a CACC communicator:
Code-1

Deferrable Non-Emergency Call (e.g., Return to a
Nursing Home)

Code-2

Scheduled Non-Emergency Call (e.g., Medical
Appointment scheduled for a set time)

Code-3

Urgent but Non-Life Threatening Emergency Call

(e.g., Back Injury, Fractured Leg, Abdominal Pain)
Code-4

Code-8

Emergency - Life Threatening Emergency Call (e.g.,
Shortness of Breath, Cardiac Arrest)
Standby for Emergency Coverage when area
ambulance is occupied on another call

Dispatch Interval

The amount of time the CACC takes to priorize a call and then
accurately select and alert an ambulance crew. Standards require
this interval to be less than 2 minutes, 90% of the time for Code-4
calls.

DSSAB

District Social Services Administration Board... Agencies

responsible for delivery of ambulance services (and other human
services) in most of Northern Ontario.
EHS

Emergency Health Services... The Branch of the Ministry of Health
and Long-Term Care responsible for ambulance services in
Ontario.

EMS

Emergency Medical Services... The general term for the network of
trained health care practitioners, equipment and procedures that
responds to medical emergencies in the community, and provides
pre-hospital care and transportation services as required.

FTE

Full Time Equivalent... Hours of staffing equivalent to those
worked by a full-time employee.

GTA

The Greater Toronto Area.
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JE

Job Evaluation... The process used by many municipalities to
compare wages paid with responsibilities required, across various
job classifications.

LAISC

Land Ambulance Implementation Steering Committee... A joint

committee of AMO and its representatives, the Ministry of Health,

and senior political representatives, that advises the Minister of
Health on ambulance transition issues.
LATT

Land Ambulance Transition Taskforce... The original broad
stakeholder group assembled to review the revised ambulance

legislation and develop appropriate transition principles and
guidelines.
LSR

Local Services Realignment initiative of the Harris government.

OAOA

Ontario Ambulance Operators' Association... Now defunct. The
primary group representing private ambulance operators in the
province prior to devolution.

0

OHA

The Ontario Hospital Association.

OPALS

Ontario Pre-hospital Advanced Life Support study... A Ministry of
Health funded pilot project investigating the benefits of adding
Advanced Care Paramedics to selected urban municipalities across
Ontario.

OPS

OPSEU

The Ontario Public Service.
The Ontario Public Service Employees Union which now
represents CACC communicators, but once represented all OPS

land and air ambulance paramedics.
PCP

Primary Care Paramedic... The minimum level of training for fulltime employment in Ontario ambulance services. Requires

successful completion of a two year community college program in
Paramedicine, and provincial certification as an Advanced EMCA.
Symptom Relief

The program that allows Primary Care Paramedics to check blood
sugar levels, administer ASA, Epinephrine, Glucose Gel,
Glucogon, Nitroglycerine and Ventolin.
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Time Stamps

The essential time elements of a given call, as recorded

electronically in ARIS by the CACC communicator:
Time-0

Initial contact with the caller and first keystrokes by

the CACC call taker.
Time-1

Confirmation of address and assignment of Call

Priority which allows the call to be electronically
transferred to a CACC dispatcher.
Time-2

Selected ambulance crew notified by base page,
radio or telephone.

Time-3

Ambulance crew notifies CACC that it is enroute to

the scene of the call.
Time-4

Ambulance arrives at the scene.

Time-5

Ambulance departs the scene for hospital.

Time-6

Ambulance arrives at the hospital.

Time-7

Ambulance clears the hospital for another

assignment or to return to base.
Time-8
UTM

Ambulance returns to base.

An Upper Tier Municipality... Either a County, Region or selected
District/City.

WDW

The "Who Does What" initiative
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